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Companies: the Hungarian Case
Csaba Makd and Peter Novoszath
The appearance of multinational companies in Hungary has, in 
general, been greeted positively by public opinion. However, some 
professionals dealing with multinationals have posed several 
questions and shown concern with the presence of such companies. 
Usually their concerns are well founded, but sometimes they are the 
result of a lack of certain knowledge, or they have an ideological 
bias (for example, that multinationals are destroying the nation’s 
industry). The most frequently voiced anxiety centres on market 
sales: namely, there are fears about the apparent elimination of 
Hungarian-produced goods on the world market. In order to give a 
more complete picture of the situation it is also necessary to point 
out those evaluations which appreciate the positive factors of 
multinationals: the development of different forms of production 
capacity, the new opportunities for employment, the technological 
developments, the modernization of the service sector, and the 
modernization of management methods.
In general, regardless of the positive or negative attitudes, at the 
moment we have comparatively little knowledge about the activities 
of multinational companies in Hungary, including information 
about their policies for manpower resources and, connected with 
this, labour relations (OECD Seminar, 1993). For example, among 
the trade unions, only the Vasas Trade Union Federation (iron, 
metal and electrical energy industry workers) has prepared a 
‘domestic’ assessment of the conduct of management towards trade 
unions in those companies in Hungary owned by foreigners. In the 
experience of Vasas, attitudes towards trade unions are varied. The 
selling-off (privatization) of the former large state companies has 
created many mixed companies (joint ventures) in which the 
management has acknowledged the existence of the trade unions in 
the state in which they found them. In some of these, attempts have 
been made to develop partnership relations. In others, such as the 
companies established by means of so-called ‘greenfield’ invest-
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Table 12.1 Attitudes o f  foreign employers toward the trade 
unions
Name of company
Nationality of 
foreign owner*
Number in the 
workforce
Positive attitude:
Ganz Ansaldo Italian 1500
Elektrolux-Lehel Swedish 2500
Ganz Merogyar Ltd French 600-700
ABB Lang Swiss 600
Packard Elektrik German 600
Laing Gepgyarto Ltd German 200-300
Negative attitude:
GB Ganz Tuzelestechnikai Ltd Italian 50
Comasec Respirator French 170
Knorr Bremse German 250
General Motors Hungary US 500
Magyar Suzuki Co Japanese 500
Celba Ltd Austrian 100
Oroshazi Mezogep US 600-700
Indifferent:
Siemens-Terta Ltd Austrian 700
Schmidt und Bender MOM German 200-300
Hungary Optikai Ltd
Magnetek Hungary US 150-200
Villamosgepgyar Ltd
Kromberg es Schubert Austrian 100
BRG ELSA Ltd Dutch 100
* The share of the foreign ownership in each case is dominant.
Source: Analysis o f the Vasas Trade Union Federation, January 1994.
ments, managements have tended to question the raison d’etre of 
the trade unions, and have often not acknowledged them as 
legitimate social partners. Obviously, such managements take 
industrial relations seriously, but they are of the opinion that the 
participatory bodies for employees (such as the factory council) can 
serve as a substitute for trade unions. The managements of the third 
group of mixed companies seem to be indifferent with regard to 
labour relations with employees. So far, they have not seen it as 
important to develop cooperative relations with employees, and 
have not established proper bodies for the protection of the 
interests of labour.
Table 12.1 demonstrates clearly the attitude of the managements 
of certain joint ventures towards relations with trade unions, 
according to the Vasas trade union survey.
In this chapter we discuss two contrasting examples of how 
foreign firms are managing labour relations in Hungary as illus­
trations of the effects of previously established practices and 
institutions on transformation processes. In general, the organiz­
ations established by ‘greenfield’ foreign investments can be seen as 
distinct from the former state-owned companies which have been 
‘re-established’ by being sold off. In the first case social- 
organizational relations have to be established from zero. In the 
second case, with the organizational changes which go along with 
the change of ownership it is necessary to take account of the earlier 
interest and power relations used for solving conflicts, as well as the 
more permanent social and cultural traditions.
We have chosen the Magyar Suzuki company to illustrate the 
operation of a multinational company of the greenfield investment 
type, and Aeroplex Ltd to represent the other extreme with a well- 
developed union structure and a highly conflict-ridden relationship 
between the social partners which led to the only strike in a joint 
venture established by multinational firms.
Before examining these two cases we will provide some details 
about the progress of other foreign investments in Hungary and 
other former socialist countries, as well as some important charac­
teristics of the development of Hungarian labour relations as an 
indication of the general context in which they developed.
Foreign Capital Investment
There is a sharp debate among experts over the extent of the 
penetration of foreign capital in Hungary. If we consider the 
privatization conducted by the AVU (State Property Agency) 
company, then we are able to speak about 10 per cent of ownership 
being in the hands of foreigners. If we examine the measurement of 
incoming capital according to the banking system (which includes 
greenfield investments, the raising of capital and privatization), 
then we find an approximate figure of US$5.6 billion. Yet according 
to some experts the figure for foreign capital arriving in Hungary 
over the past few years is much greater than that. This is because the 
statistics published by the Hungarian National Bank do not include 
the capital equipment contributions, and do not consider secondary 
capital transactions -  for example, the selling off of shares. It is also 
very difficult to assess the number of mixed companies. Officially, at 
the end of 1993 there were 19,722 joint ventures in Hungary. 
However, in this figure we can find companies that are wholly 
foreign owned, alongside those in which the overseas partner has 
only a few thousand Hungarian forints (HUF) invested.
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Table 12.2 Number o f  joint ventures and stock o f  foreign 
capital in Hungary, 1989-1993
Estimated stock of
foreign capital if -
Estimated stock according to the
Number of joint of capital balance of payments -
ventures with Stock of capital arriving in profit eligible for
Hungarian and arriving in Hungary in cash repatriation is
foreign Hungary in cash and moveables reinvested
Year participation (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million)
1989 1,879 215 _ _
1990 5,693 569 1,200 1,200
1991 11,335 2,107 3,000 3,100
1992 15,436 3,424 4,500 4,800
1993 19,722 5,576 6,700 7,400
Source: Hungarian National Bank and National Statistical Office
The number of newly established joint ventures and the stock of 
direct foreign capital investment are illustrated in Table 12.2. With 
reference to these details, probably the most reliable come from the 
multinationals themselves, though even with these it is rather the 
measurement of ownership which is shown, and the real extent of 
the operation remains vague. (By means of price accounts and 
daughter companies, the multinationals publish profits in those 
countries where the tax conditions are most favourable.)
According to the data presented by the State Property Agency in
1992, investments from the USA were dominant in Hungary 
(representing 29 per cent of all investments); next in line were 
Germany (20 per cent), Austria (14 per cent) and France (7 per 
cent). On the basis of partial data from 1993, it seems likely that 
Germany is now the biggest investor in Hungary, with Austria, the 
USA, Italy and France following in that order.
Among the former socialist countries it is Hungary which has 
attracted most foreign investment. There is no doubt that the 
reforms of recent decades have played a role in this. It was in this 
part of the whole region that the investors found the most up-to- 
date laws of association, a bank system and a capital market. The 
investors have been attracted by the relatively high-skilled work­
force, the -  relative to Western Europe -  low wage bills, and the 
lower costs of infrastructural development. Although the data for 
1993 show that Hungary’s favourable position has weakened 
(because it seems that Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia are
Table 12.3 Foreign capital investments in Central and Eastern 
Europe
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Growth of foreign capital investment (US$ millions) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Slovakia 5 20 53 130 350
Bulgaria 10 20 100 130 350
Romania 20 18 187 240 221
Ukraine 10 50 100 280 520
Poland 60 88 470 830 1100
Czech Lands 10 166 200 1210 1100
Hungary 120 311 1538 1317 2000
Slovenia 163 500 600 700 700
Total 398 1173 3248 4837 6341
Source: East-W est Investments and Joint-Ventures, UN  ECE, Geneva, 1989-1993
closing on Hungary) its relative advantage is still apparent, as is 
shown in Table 12.3.
In Hungary, the majority of mixed companies formed with the 
participation of foreign capital investment have, up to now, mainly 
changed the ownership structure and -  albeit to a lesser extent -  the 
process of enterprise activities. Major changes in ‘operational 
capital’ usually appear when the moment comes for extending 
production capacities by raising the form of the basic capital. For 
example, 40 per cent of the shares of the Chinoin pharmaceutical 
company were bought by the French firm Sanofi, but in the first 
instance this resulted in nothing more than slight structural modifi­
cations for the Hungarian company. In the next stage, an increase of 
basic capital investment occurred, and US$10 million of this 
increase contributed to the development of production capacities. A 
similar example is when General Electric bought shares in the 
Hungarian Tungsram electrical company.
General Characteristics of Company-level Labour 
Relations in Hungary
Before looking at certain examples of labour relations in multi­
national firms, we want to outline the key characteristics of trade 
union participation in enterprises at the beginning of the 1990s. Our 
observations are based on the results of studies carried out in 
Hungary by the Japanese Institute of Labour in the summer of 1992 
and the spring of 1993. The most important finding of the research 
was that -  despite the appearance of large-membership trade unions
in the wake of the political system change, and despite the changing 
strengths of the political, ideological and personal rivalries -  at the 
company level, cooperation between employers and trade unions 
remained the dominant feature. This cooperation was influenced by 
the structural and circumstantial conditions of the economic 
recession, especially with regard to protection of employees’ inter­
ests and improving the survival chances of companies.
The company-level cooperation of trade unions and employees 
has a very long tradition in Hungary and among the relatively 
permanent conditions that existed under state socialism was the 
employees’ distinct tradition of dual loyalty (Mako, 1993). In other 
words, the employees supported both the company leadership and 
the trade union. The management and workers (trade unions) 
organized themselves into a coalition of interests in a continuing 
struggle with central organizations (ministries, etc.) over the distri­
bution of centrally supplied resources -  although they were often 
allied with these central organizations as well. The cooperative 
connections between management and workers in defence of their 
perceived common interests at the company level were also charac­
teristic of the other former socialist countries. For example, in 
Poland, as Tatur reports in Chapter 8, workers tend to identify with 
‘their’ firms and enterprise survival is a central goal for most 
employees.
In the analyses carried out by the Japanese Institute of Labour, a 
decisive majority of the enterprises involved (85 per cent) had some 
form of worker interest representation, and among these the 
greatest influence came from the state socialist -  but restructured 
and renewed -  trade union confederation (Hungarian Trade Unions 
National Federation, MSZOSZ). In terms of the topic of labour 
disputes, privatization and recession have caused major changes. As 
Table 12.4 indicates, under the state socialist regime most disputes 
were concerned with wages and other rewards, as well as the 
organization of work.
Nowadays, besides the still important question of wages, we find 
privatization, reorganization of companies and, in connection with 
these, employment protection (included here are redundancy pro­
cedures and the circumstances of redundancy). It is these points that 
have moved to the centre of disputes.
Another current feature of labour relations is that the trade 
unions still search for cooperation with management, although this 
can be upset by such things as cuts in the workforce. For example, 
from among the trade unions affiliated to MSZOSZ, although 20 
have rejected any cutbacks in the workforce, a majority (99) have 
accepted them and a significant number (64) have even supported
260 Industrial Transformation in Europe
Employment Relations in Multinational Companies 261
Table 12.4 Changing topics o f  labour disputes
Subject of dispute Before 1990 1990 and after
Reorganization of the company 96 117
Implementation of privatization 30 114
Introduction of worker ownership 24 109
Safety in the workplace 85 175
Wage issues 245 213
Other allowances, not including wages 196 158
Work schedule and sharing out of shifts 84 54
Work time (overtime) 84 64
Redundancy payments 39 122
Source: Research carried out by the Japan Institute of Labour (JIL), Tokyo, 1992
T able  12.5 Strikes in Hungary and Poland
Country
Number of those participating in 
Number of strikes strikes (in thousands)
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
Hungary
Poland
3 10 17 
305 6362 7362
250 25-30 20 
221 730 382
Source: Csaba Mako and Agnes Simonyi, ‘Participation on Firm Level in the 
Transformation Process’, Paper prepared for the XHIth World Congress of Socio­
logy, RC No. 10, Session 7, Bielfeld, Germany, 18-23 July 1994
cutbacks. With respect to the first of the independent trade union 
organizations to be formed -  the Democratic Trade Unions 
National Federation (Liga) -  it had one affiliated member organiz­
ation which rejected workforce cuts, while the others demonstrated 
the acquiescent or even supportive attitude found within the circle 
of trade unions involved with those companies included in the 
national sample.
At both a national and local level open conflict was not character­
istic of labour relations. The numbers of strikes and those partici­
pating in strikes are much lower in Hungary than, for example, the 
numbers occurring due to the construction of a market economy in 
Poland, as is shown in Table 12.5. The low number of strikes does 
not indicate that there are no workplace conflicts, but suggests that 
among the forms of employee participation (direct and indirect) it is 
the peaceful solutions that are preferred. In the majority of strike 
cases, the employees spoke about the ‘non-cooperative’ behaviour 
of management.
Factory Councils instead of Trade Unions: the Example 
of Magyar Suzuki Corporation
The extent of Japanese capital investment in the former socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe is negligible. This 
tendency should be seen in the light of the observation that out of 
the total amount of Japanese investment, almost half has been 
placed in Hungary and more than a quarter of that has been in form 
of investments (US$74.4 million). In addition, almost half the 
invested total was put towards the establishment of the Magyar 
Suzuki company.
After almost 10 years of negotiations, in 1990 the founding 
document of the Magyar Suzuki company showed that Japanese 
capital would have a 51 per cent stake in the company (Suzuki 
motor company 40 per cent, C. Itoh 11 per cent, and the Inter­
national Financial Corporation 9 per cent). With the establishment 
of the Japanese-Hungarian car factory particular market consider­
ations played a role: (a) at the beginning of the 1990s the average 
age of Hungarian cars was 10 years; (b) out of three million cars, 
almost one-third had owners who urgently wanted to replace them; 
these cars were more than 10 years old and two-fifths were 
environment polluting two-cylinder cars; (c) after 1990 cars 
imported into Hungary had a 35 per cent customs duty placed on 
them. The five-door Swift model and the four-door Sedan model 
manufactured in Suzuki’s Hungarian factory were to constitute part 
of the company’s world market strategy. This was in line with the 
production of a small car in India, a middle category and a larger 
Sedan version in Hungary, and a Land Rover-type vehicle (the 
Santana) in Spain. Magyar Suzuki planned to produce 50,000 units 
annually, but the plant’s capacity enables it to manufacture 100,000 
units. At the time of opening the factory, the composition of 
production in total value was intended to developed in the way 
outlined in Table 12.6.
The starting plan was based on the assumption that a large-scale 
modification and powerful rise in the exchange rate of the yen 
would take place, and in line with this a devaluation of the HUF. 
The company’s 17 billion yen credit stock grew from HUF 10 billion 
to HUF 16 billion in the first half of 1993. In order to finance the 
more expensive credit, the company raised the basic HUF capital 
from HUF 5.5 billion to HUF 13 billion through the Hungarian 
partner contributing HUF 1.3 billion from the credit of the 
Autokonszern company (a conglomerate comprising almost 50 
state-owned firms), guaranteed by the Hungarian government. 
When Magyar Suzuki began its operations the Hungarian partner
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Table 12.6 Planned composition o f  production
1992
(%)
1993
(%)
1994
(%)
Japan Suzuki (imports) 70 60 40
Hungarian participation 30 40 60
Magyar Suzuki Co (Esztergom) 20 20 20
other outworkers 10 20 40
Total 100 100 100
Source: Gabor Bakos (1992) ‘Japan and Central Europe: New Subregional 
formation and Japan’s presence’, Tokyo: The Institute of Economic Research, 
Hitotsubashi University, p. 33.
had a 40 per cent share in ownership, but after raising the capital 
this decreased to 25 per cent ownership plus one share. These 
changes in ownership structure were reflected in management 
changes, in particular the Hungarian managing director was re­
placed by a Japanese national.
The significant increase in the exchange rate of the yen also 
affected the cost of components coming from Japan. Magyar Suzuki 
protected itself against the increased cost of imports by bringing 
forward the date on which it was stipulated that 50 per cent of 
components allocated for production would be Hungarian and 10 
per cent West European. This meant that by the end of 1993 the 
Hungarian production of components in Esztergom represented 20 
per cent of the total value, and a further 30 per cent came from 
other domestic suppliers (where the original figure for the latter had 
been 20 per cent).
This was also of key importance, because the conditions for 
customs duty exemptions on exports going to the European Union 
require that a minimum of 50 per cent of the product should be of 
domestic origin, and only in this way could Magyar Suzuki be 
counted as a Hungarian product. Thus the intended exports to the 
EU started earlier than the actual time planned.
The effect of the investment in employment growth on the labour 
market -  given that Esztergom had a 20 per cent unemployment 
rate in 1993, against a national rate of 14 per cent -  was significant. 
At full production the central factory (in the town of Esztergom) 
provided 1000 jobs, while the supplying factories provide employ­
ment for between 17 and 18,000 workers. In less than two years of 
operation the Magyar Suzuki company had contracts with 33 
Hungarian supply manufacturers. By April 1993, 150 Hungarian 
workers had taken part in training at Suzuki motor company’s Kosai 
(Japan) plant, while the majority of employees in Hungary had
received training in Hungary itself. Suzuki provided 25 individuals 
to help the Hungarian management at the company, and likewise 25 
other individuals are active in the area of production management.
In selecting the labour force, young (20-25 years), well-qualified 
applicants had an advantage; at the beginning there were three 
times the number of applicants than available jobs, but later this 
proportion decreased. Those Hungarians who took part in further 
training in the Suzuki plant in Japan criticized the Japanese 
conditions of work (the daily schedule, the one and a half hours’ 
overtime, meals etc.). In spite of these points, only 15 individuals 
resigned from the company. The Japanese company management is 
extremely satisfied with the standard of the Hungarian maintenance 
operators, and in general they feel the Hungarian workers are too 
well qualified.
With regard to wages, multinational companies active in Hungary 
follow two types of strategy. Either they tend to follow the local 
labour market and take into account comparatively significant 
fluctuations, or they pay 20-30 per cent more than the average in 
order to win the loyalty of the labour force. The Magyar Suzuki 
company has followed the second approach, on the whole. Workers 
on the production line earn between HUF 25,000 and 27,000 per 
month, while those involved in production management and fore­
men receive 20 per cent more than the line workers; apart from this 
employees are also eligible for a production-related premium. The 
performance of the labour force is evaluated twice per year — and 
that applies to both shopfloor workers and management.
In the areas of work schedules and work organization the 
Japanese company management employs the characteristic prac­
tices used with other workforces in Japan (job rotation, QC, etc.). 
In connection with this the Japanese management has complained 
that the Hungarians are individualistic and their team spirit is weak 
(Neumann, 1993). At Magyar Suzuki the regulatory mechanisms 
and instruments for labour relations are not yet fully settled, nor are 
the methods for human resource management. In spite of this it is 
possible to assess the characteristic attitudes of the company 
management towards the trade unions. At the factory the organiz­
ation of trade unions was present from the beginning. On the 
occasion of the factory’s first anniversary, 7 per cent of the 
workforce were members of the Vasas trade union. This union had 
initiated the organization of employees’ interest representation 
from outside the factory. The company’s management does not 
have a friendly relationship with any trade union; besides other 
things, this clearly illustrates that so far the management has not felt 
the lack of such a partner with whom it could make a collective
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contract, as regulated in the stipulations of the new Employment 
Law. Additionally the Suzuki management has banned the gather­
ing of trade union members on the premises of the company. In the 
view of one worker:
We need to realize that we cannot act upon our interests with any 
meaningful results if we do not have a trade union. One year ago this 
autumn we announced ourselves at the company, but they didn’t even 
allow the regional trade union leadership into the factory, because they 
said it is a custom-free area, and thus an organization from outside the 
factory cannot start organizing within it. (Worker, trade union leader, 
quoted in Nepszava, 1 October 1993: 4)
Not only has no place been given to the trade union, but the 
newspapers which are usually pinned on the wall in the factory -  and 
which it had been promised would be allowed -  were, in the event, 
prohibited. In reply, the trade union arranged a meeting of workers 
in the dining room of the neighbouring premises of the former 
Ecom company. The basic membership of the trade union was 
almost doubled to 200 because of the effect of the meeting. The 
trade union’s main purpose was to persuade the management of 
Magyar Suzuki to establish fair labour relations, not to adopt an 
uncompromising position. The car manufacturing branch of the 
Vasas trade union laid down that a collective agreement could be 
linked up with their own.
Nevertheless, the company management demanded that the 
employees should participate in any decision in line with the 
management’s own requirements. Without this it was felt to be 
impossible to create guaranteed, undisturbed production in which 
there would be a two-sided -  top-down, bottom-up -  communi­
cation structure. This explains why a Works Council was brought 
into existence in Magyar Suzuki in October 1992, although elections 
for the Council only took place early in the summer of 1993. With 
reference to all this, one of the leading managers of Magyar Suzuki 
announced:
the Works Council is perfectly appropriate for establishing the paternal­
istic model of Japanese management in Esztergom. (in Heti 
Vilaggazdasag, 21 August 1993: 81)
The nine-member Works Council sits monthly, and it mainly deals 
with such issues as the production plan, training and wage increases. 
Although the Works Council is not an interest-protection body, and 
its regulations do not state that it has such a purpose, in Magyar 
Suzuki it does in fact provide several interest-protecting functions:
We are not involved with interest-protection, but even so we have 
achieved much in that direction. We have installed an extremely 
expensive extractor system at the end of the production line, where the
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motor engines are tested. There are many workers who commute to the 
factory and we have solved their problems by using our own and hired 
buses. However, the main question -  in fact, I can say the key question -  
is that of wages and bonuses. For a gross wage of between HUF 16-19 
thousand the employees have to fulfil hard and highly quality-oriented 
tasks. I think that this will be the most important issue facing the 
increasingly strong trade union. (Worker, Factory Works Council 
member, in Nepszava, 1 October 1993: 4)
The central point of the friction between management and labour 
is the question of basic wages. The bulk of the workforce is aged 
between 23-25, and they receive a monthly basic wage of HUF 17- 
18,000; it is virtually impossible to live on this (in 1993 the 
Hungarian subsistence level was reckoned to be HUF 13,459). This 
is why the trade union is attempting to reach agreement with the 
Magyar Suzuki management over average wage rises on a sectoral 
basis, index linked to achieve a balance with high inflation, and the 
alleviation of social problems. However, the company management 
does not favour index-linked wages, and they are trying to empha­
size that annual wage rises should take account of the hours spent at 
work and productivity. At the moment, the ability of the Suzuki 
management to impose its preferred system of labour management 
and rewards remains in doubt because of the strength of insti­
tutionalized expectations and revitalized labour organizations.
Transformation of State Property without the 
Participation of the Employee: the Example of the 
Malev and Lockheed Joint Venture
Establishment o f the Joint Venture
So far there has only been one instance of a strike in a multinational 
company operating in Hungary. The strike that broke out at 
Aeroplex Central Europe (ACE) originated largely from the way 
privatization was achieved which forced the workers to initiate a 
strike in which they put their own jobs at risk.
At the end of 1990, the management of the Hungarian Air 
Transport Company (hereafter Malev) began negotiations with the 
US company, Lockheed Aircraft International Service (hereafter 
Lockheed), on the possibilities of establishing a joint venture 
company for aircraft repairs and maintenance. In February 1991 it 
was officially announced that a proposal of intent had been signed 
with regard to establishing the joint venture. The two companies 
each contributed 50 per cent of the basic capital to establish a 
limited liability company whose main task would be the mainten­
ance of all Malev aircraft, as well as the aircraft of other airline
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companies. The joint venture’s other purposes were to modernize 
the methods of aircraft maintenance, to introduce modern manage­
ment and working methods from the US partner, and to acquire 
accreditation and licences from the aircraft authority representing 
the most advanced Western countries -  namely, from the FAA.
The Malev workers and their representatives in the trade unions 
were offended by the fact that the company’s managing director 
made decisions about the joint venture without even informing 
them, let alone seeking their agreement. In the opinion of the 
workers, this happened because he wanted to sell the company’s 
secure market position and a good labour force to the joint venture 
company for -  by Western standards -  a ridiculously low price. As a 
result, the workers and trade unions attempted to find out from the 
Malev management whether they negotiated with any other poss­
ible partners, and on what basis they had opted for the US 
company; they also wanted to know how all this fitted in with 
Malev’s plans with regard to privatization, which were being 
discussed at that time. The trade union sent more than one letter to 
members of the government in connection with this matter. For 
instance, they wrote the following to the Transport Minister:
For the past 7-8 months we have heard all kinds of things about the 
future of our company. We have read seemingly contradictory inform­
ation serving various different interests. At the same time nobody has 
asked the collective of the company about any of these things. The 
collective has not even been asked what it thinks about the matter, or 
whether it has any suggestions to make.
Beside the issue of the establishment of a joint venture, disputes 
arose between the workforce and the management over the plan for 
privatization. The trade unions and management were united in 
their judgement on the need for privatization; however, they were 
divided on how its implementation should be realized.
The trade unions were strongly critical of the proposals which had 
been prepared for the economic policy makers in the government. 
They believed that before the privatization of Malev took place, it 
would be necessary to decide on the methods which would ensure 
that the whole process served the strengthening and maintenance of 
national property. In particular, they wanted the ownership partner 
to guarantee that they would be able to protect long-term job 
opportunities for the workforce, and upgrade the conditions of 
work and living standards. It was only in this spirit that the trade 
unions would accept the establishment of the joint venture for 
aircraft maintenance.
Malev’s then director-general initially conceived of the foun­
dation of the joint venture as constituting a partial privatization of
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Malev, but the trade unions found out that the proposed Lockheed- 
Malev Ltd could not be regarded at all as constituting a (partial) 
privatization of Malev in accordance with Hungarian legislation in 
force, but simply as the establishment of a new economic associ­
ation.
Advisers to the unions also pointed out that in the planned joint 
venture the whole of the technical and aircraft repair capacity would 
fall outside the process of privatization. In as much as the 
employees of Malev could transfer to the new joint venture before 
its foundation, they could also lose several rights guaranteed by law; 
among other things, they would have to stay completely out of the 
process of privatization and would lose the opportunity to buy 
worker’s shares. Furthermore, the experts showed that Lockheed’s 
planned activities -  with much lower than necessary investments -  
seemed to be aimed at achieving a significant market position at a 
cheap price, in order to have economic-political advantages in the 
region, and would devalue the ‘remaining’ Malev, because the joint 
company would be managed by Lockheed staff. Nobody else would 
be able to repair their aircraft, so that the national airline and, in 
time, the only international airport in Hungary, could become 
dependent on Lockheed at a ridiculously low price.
The Lockheed case posed a serious decision-making dilemma for 
Malev’s trade unions, for workers did not in general question the 
need for such a joint venture. Accordingly the trade unions 
negotiated with the Malev management, but also tried to assert 
their rights politically. In several cases they lodged written protests 
with the State Property Agency (SPA) and the Ministry of Trans­
port, Communications and Water Management (MTCWM). 
Several issues concerned the employees and trade unions: what sort 
of chances would there be for the joint venture, considering that its 
establishment was not going to bring any significant technical 
development? How would employment chances develop in the 
future: would there be mass unemployment? Before the establish­
ment of the joint venture, in the technical area there were almost 
1150 principal workers, yet Lockheed had suggested that about 900 
principal workers would be adequate. Was there no danger that the 
given technology and cheap labour force would encourage the US 
partner to prefer less well qualified personnel to do lower paid tasks 
(for instance, the work of a fitter)? Those workers who could speak 
English were retrained so that they could handle the Boeing 
aircraft, and those who were still able to sell their abilities were all 
right; however, the others were placed in a disadvantageous 
situation. What would happen to wages if the earlier practice of 
overtime and other part-time opportunities were abolished?
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The effect of this was that, on 21 January 1992, representatives 
from the above-mentioned authorities and Malev discussed the 
matter of the joint company in a committee established specially for 
the purpose. In the negotiations, those representing the employees 
repeatedly indicated that notice should be taken of their demands in 
the planned contract (that is before its signing). If their legal rights 
were not suitably recognized they did not want the final contract. 
The ministry and the management of Malev gave a promise at this 
sitting. Thus it was with astonishment and outrage that the workers 
learned that after this the Malev managing director had signed -  in 
Budapest on 24 January 1992 -  the relevant contract for the 
establishment of the joint venture with the representatives of 
Lockheed, without any agreement with the workers.
After all this, it is understandable that the contract that brought 
Aeroplex into existence became the centre of conflicts between the 
management and those representing the workers’ interests; more­
over, somewhat later it caused quarrels between the two ownership 
partners. On 5 February at a trade union roundtable meeting there 
was unanimous agreement that a protest should be made against the 
methods that had been used, and it was announced that in 
connection with the establishment of the joint venture the 
employees’ side would accept no responsibility whatsoever. In spite 
of the protest, on 6 February Malev’s legal representative handed in 
a request to the court for company registration, asking for immedi­
ate registration of the joint venture, which the court proceeded to 
give. Therefore, Aeroplex of Central Europe Ltd (ACE) was 
formally established.
Incidentally, the trade union roundtable of 5 February can be 
regarded as the Malev trade unions’ and the aircraft technicians 
trade unions’ last action together. In 1989-90, as with the rest of the 
country, a fragmentation of trade unions took place at Malev. 
Practically all the trade union federations that had been affiliated to 
MSZOSZ remained with that organization; additionally two other 
trade unions which were close to the liberal Independent Trade 
Unions Democratic League (FSZDL) were established. One of 
these unions allied itself with the new US-Hungarian joint venture. 
Two other trade unions were also set up, the pilots’ union and the 
air stewards and hostesses’ union (neither of these affiliated to any 
national federation).
The formation of the joint venture occurred at a time (1991-92) 
when powerful debates were taking place between the seven largest 
national trade union groupings over the division of trade union 
property, and there were also questions being asked about legitima­
tion and representation. These debates prevented the chances of
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common action being taken to achieve interest representation 
through a single organization.
The Strike
The room for manoeuvre of those trade unions which came across 
to the new joint venture company was narrowed down right from 
the start; this was because their main task of maintenance had been 
broken away from the mother company. Because the trade union 
roundtable was not successful, the contract signed between Malev 
and Lockheed had the effect of unambiguously removing the field of 
maintenance work from the privatization process at Malev. Those 
trade unions involved in maintenance (the Aircraft Technicians 
Independent Trade Union) went on (without the other interest 
representation organizations) to make a new attempt to have its 
interests recognized. On 20 March it handed in a petition asking for 
a re-examination of the foundation of the joint company, and 
termination of the company due to breach of regulations.
Despite all this, on 30 June 1992 ACE officially began its 
operations with 840 workers and 6 US managers. The management 
did not employ the leaders of the trade union who had opposed the 
foundation of the mixed company, which further weakened the 
position of the trade union. In the last days of June 1992 the workers 
of Malev’s Maintenance Division called personally on the head of 
Malev’s human resource management centre to cancel the labour 
contract with ACE, because they thought they would no longer 
enjoy various benefits due to them as ‘Malev men’. Thereupon, 
when Aeroplex was formed, all workers transferred from Malev 
received a wage increase of 21 per cent under a one-year agreement. 
That was not, however, an effective increase, but a compensation 
for lost benefits formerly granted on a non-regular basis, and as an 
across-the-board measure it failed to reduce existing disparities in 
wages to any degree.
In return for the ‘wage increase’ the employees promised that 
they would not make any further wage demands for a year. In fact 
there were no demands for wage increases (except for 20 per cent 
for the higher management of the firm before the General Assembly 
of April 1993). It also seemed that the situation of the workers was 
‘normalized’, and the earlier tensions died down.
Meanwhile the privatization of the Malev airline company began: 
the first steps in this process involved the formation of a so-called 
‘individual (state) share company’; later 35 per cent of the shares 
were sold to a foreign partner. This partner was Alitalia, which was 
the winner in international negotiations involving such applicants as 
Lufthansa and KLM. The privatization of the company finished in
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1993, when the foreign investor paid the purchase price of the 
shares.
The new management of the Malev share company, in contrast to 
the earlier management, did not view the Malev-Lockheed agree­
ment as being unambiguously positive, and on more and more 
occasions expressed their dissatisfaction to ACE that the repair- 
maintenance deadlines were not being kept, and were leading to 
flight delays. In July 1993 Malev publicly announced that ACE was 
not operating well, and this was causing flight delays and damage to 
the standards of the airline company’s services:
According to Malev’s timetable their flights and other charter flights 
faced significant delays yesterday. For example, the flight to Istanbul 
arrived eight hours late . . . the Aeroplex company (the Malev and 
Lockheed joint company) does not always observe deadlines for main­
tenance of Malev aircraft. Yesterday Malev held a meeting about the 
situation that has emerged, when the delays demonstrated that the theme 
was timely. (‘Malev is delayed’, in Nipszabadsag, 23 July 1993)
According to Malev’s account the delays were increasing at a 
worrying rate; in 1992 18 per cent of flights were delayed, in 1993 
the figure stood at 22 per cent. The average duration of the delays 
went up from 34 to 40 minutes in the same period. Of these delays, 
in 1992 31 per cent could be put down to mistakes made by Malev, 
in 1993 this figure was 37 per cent. However, during that time 
Malev’s total number of aircraft increased, the older planes were 
becoming even older, and there was a greater number of flights. It 
was argued that this implied a bigger task for the now separate 
technical base where, compared to the earlier position, almost 150 
less people were employed.
In connection with the delays, Malev claimed that the Malev- 
Lockheed contract was not advantageous from Malev’s point of 
view. This was because the repair company’s work was to a large 
extent not accountable in terms of time, and thus it was not of 
paramount importance for Aeroplex to meet deadlines. The main 
source of the problem was that the so-called ‘line maintenance’ was 
not in Malev’s hands, and therefore the necessary technical back­
ground to ensure the flow of daily air traffic was also out of the 
control of the airline company. This is why it was suggested that, in 
the future, it should be Malev’s own specialists who would rectify 
the problems; for this a suitable apparatus needed to be created.
Malev’s supervisory committee, in cooperation with Alitalia, 
began to re-examine the contents of the contract between Aeroplex 
and Malev. Meanwhile, on 30 June 1993, the ‘wage moratorium’ 
that ACE had agreed with the workers at the time of its foundation 
expired. According to the trade union it was owing to the mistakes
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of the management of Aeroplex (due to their poor preparation) that 
an agreement on a collective contract had not been made. Thus the 
Aircraft Technician’s Independent Trade Union (RMFSZ) could 
see little sense in wage negotiations. On 15 July the trade union 
announced that, independent of the collective contract, it would 
begin wage talks, and it put in a request for a near 200 per cent wage 
increase (as opposed to the company’s suggestion of a 14 per cent 
rise). On 2 and 3 August the management’s offer was raised to 18 
per cent. The employees’ representatives worked out their own 
scheme -  which the company management accepted -  in which they 
insisted on a HUF 30,000 monthly minimum wage.
The RMFSZ held that a differential wage rise would only be 
acceptable if it noticeably decreased the earlier discrepancies. On 
this basis the workers delegated representatives who worked out a 
set of criteria which paid attention to the norms recognized for 
aircraft mechanics in international practice. They were not able to 
establish much else because there were no job description agree­
ments with the company, nor were there any regulations for 
organizational operation. In 1993, in order that every worker fully 
received the pay according to the criteria accepted by the manage­
ment, it would have been necessary to implement a 150 per cent 
increase in the overall wage bill. According to the spokesman of the 
Aircraft Technicians Independent Trade Union (RMFSZ):
They inherited this tension-filled wage system from Malev, on the basis
of which there exists within one sphere of work activity wages ranging
between HUF 20,000 and HUF 60,000. (Heti Vildggazdasag, 21 August
1993: 80)
On 5 August the management of ACE worked out a wage 
development package, according to which wage levels for the 
workers would be ‘fixed’ until the end of 1994 on the basis of the 
following: 18 per cent immediate wage rise (from 1 July 1993); 10 
per cent from 1 January 1994; 10 per cent from 1 July 1994.
The following day the trade union handed in a proposal which 
demanded a 90 per cent increase from 1 July 1993, a 30 per cent 
increase from 1 January 1994, and a 20 per cent increase from 1 July
1994. On 7 August ACE raised the 1993 wage increase by 20 per 
cent. In a workers’ assembly on 11 August the trade union agreed to 
a seven-day ‘cooling-off period, and in the case of unsuccessful 
negotiations raised the prospect of a strike. On 18 August a 
workers’ assembly was once again organized by the trade unions. 
Here the interest representatives announced that the negotiations 
had been totally unsuccessful, but in spite of this they did not call a 
strike, postponing this step for an indefinite period. According to 
the trade union, Malev wanted to use the wage dispute and the
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strike to break up the contract with Aeroplex. Malev brought in 
English mechanics, and on 23 August announced that if the trade 
union (RMFSZ) did not withdraw its strike threat by midnight, then 
Malev would ignore all wage proposals made so far. In reply — the 
seven days having passed -  on 24th August at 6 pm the ACE 
workers ceased work and declared that their wage demand for the 
year was 50 per cent, and that the wage rise for 1994 would be left 
open. The negotiations of 25 and 26 August did not produce any 
results and the strike proceeded with almost 100 per cent support.
Yet on 27 August the ACE workers suspended the strike for an 
indefinite period because they did not want to be held responsible 
for the inadequate condition of Malev aircraft, or for any accidents 
which might occur because of such inadequacy. Prior to this the 
Transport Workers International Federation labelled the employ­
ment of English mechanics as serious strike breaking, and MSZOSZ 
and the Federation of Workers Councils criticized the employers’ 
actions in similar fashion.
The strike and especially the strong support of the trade union 
federations for the action put pressure on the Malev management to 
change the negative attitude it had shown in earlier talks and so the 
trade union achieved its main purpose in the follow-up negotiations
-  that is the ability to take part in decisions affecting the company. 
After this, strong skirmishing took place for four days concerning 
the level of wage rises, which finally resulted in the trade union 
accepting a wage offer of 34.6 per cent. This amount was well below 
their original expectations, but knowing the financial situation of 
Malev, Lockheed and Aeroplex, they realized that this was the 
maximum increase possible.
Lessons from the Strike
Many lessons can be learned from the conflicts that originated in 
connection with the talks between the management, employees and 
the trade union representatives of the latter. Among these, and 
from our point of view the most important, is that the disputes could 
have been averted at the time the joint venture was established, had 
the trade unions been treated as partners.
Additionally, there were many arguments inside and outside the 
company -  indeed, even within Lockheed itself -  which were against 
the planned structure of the joint venture company. The strike of 
the Aeroplex workers showed that there were serious professional 
and financial problems with the contract between Malev and 
Lockheed concerning the establishment of Aeroplex. And one of 
the most significant results of the strike was that, with a clearer 
articulation of interests, the combatants on the different sides of the
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barricade woke up to the fact that there was one single possibility 
for finding a common interest:
In the past few days everything has come together: the wage question, 
the grievances connected with the reorganization of a year ago, the 
uncertainty and fear attached to the future, and the most important thing
-  the almost complete lack of information and the ignoring of a 
succession of opinions from the employees. Perhaps the real result of 
these events is that we cannot make progress without understanding each 
other. Therefore we need to talk about things, to negotiate, to listen to 
each other’s opinions, and to take stock of the situation before difficult 
situations emerge. (Aircraft mechanic, leader of the RMFSZ trade 
union, in Legikdzlekedes, 21 September 1993: 2)
A further significant aspect of the strike concerns relations 
between different groups of workers and unions at Malev. Before 
the maintenance workers’ dispute flared up, the Malev pilots held a 
warning strike for nearly two hours in support of their wage 
demands on 11 June 1993. The pilots’ aim was to achieve wage 
proportions between the different groups of workers which 
approached the international average. From many points of view 
this strike set a precedent which stirred the aircraft mechanics. 
Although there were plenty of common causes in the background of 
the two strikes, the essential difference was that the pilots managed 
to get all the workers of the company behind them, as well as the 
various differentiated confederations of interest representation 
groups, who earlier had been rivals.
In contrast, the primary aim of the trade union of the aircraft 
mechanics was to gain political support and the support of relevant 
national confederations, rather than a strengthening of joint action 
of local organizations. The mechanics emphasized the following:
We were unable to acquire political support through the League; the 
parties involved were afraid -  probably due to the approaching election -  
that the strike would lead to a nationwide transport strike. By the end of 
the negotiations it had become clear: every day of the recent strike would 
have significantly increased Malev’s losses, and would have resulted in 
redundancies at Malev and Aeroplex. There was not one trade union 
which could accept this, because they also had to think about the fact 
that, somehow, the employees would always end up paying for these 
losses. This is why we have to come to an agreement without a strike. 
(Spokesman of the Aircraft Technicians Independent Trade Union 
(RMFSZ), in Nepszabadsag, 14 September 1993: 5)
Opposition to the use of strike breakers enabled the RMFSZ to 
gain the support of the two biggest influential trade union confeder­
ations, and this helped them considerably in achieving their aims. 
At the same time the company-level trade unions and especially the 
company’s other workers did not show any support or sympathy.
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Indeed, there was a certain antipathy towards the strike movement, 
in that a significant number of the airline company’s employees felt 
that the aircraft mechanics’ wage demands were exaggerated.
It would probably have produced better results for the employees 
if the aircraft mechanics’ trade union had joined forces with the 
pilots in pressing their wage demands: if they had not obtained the 
wage rise then, they could have stopped working. They had asked 
for a 200 per cent rise, although they had no chance of achieving it; 
yet Malev workers, especially the pilots, gained sympathy -  even 
though because of the strike their wages decreased. The leaders of 
Lockheed and Malev stated in Brussels, in March 1994, that they 
would act to resolve the problems of the joint venture. In the 
negotiations both sides strengthened their support for Aeroplex and 
were determined to achieve appropriate growth. It was also because 
of this that there were talks about the by now controversial contract. 
Mutual concerns were given greater emphasis, and these common 
aims all stressed the priority of gradually realizing the aims of 
Malev.
Conclusions
These two cases show how institutional legacies can have a strong 
impact on labour relations in foreign-owned enterprises and joint 
ventures in Hungary, and, by extension, other former state socialist 
societies. Even in the ‘greenfield’ situation at Suzuki, the trade 
unions have been able to attract considerable support from the 
managerially carefully selected workforce and seem likely to domi­
nate the works council, as indeed is common throughout Hungary. 
Earlier patterns of interest representation and cooperation between 
unions and management remain highly influential and the desire for 
collective involvement in the affairs of companies seems to be a 
central value for many Hungarian workers. Multinational firms 
cannot easily impose their own preferred management style and 
system of employment relations without taking these patterns and 
values into account.
A further important point which arises from this discussion 
concerns the relations between different unions at the enterprise 
and national levels, and the recourse to political support in wage 
and representation disputes. The fragmentation of the trade unions 
considerably weakened the power of the mechanics in the Aeroplex 
case, and they were unable to gain the support of other workers in 
Malev. However, the use of strike breakers enabled them to mobilize 
national federation support which was critical in changing manage­
ment’s approach, and which had been lacking earlier. The growing
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influence of the former socialist trade union federation will probably 
limit the effects of fragmentation -  at least in the larger firms -  and 
increase the significance of labour organizations, but the extent to 
which national unions will be integrated with and control enterprise- 
level unions remains unclear. Relatedly, the links between this 
federation and the socialist party currently in power in Hungary 
may weaken its support at the local level, as has occurred in Poland 
(see Chapter 8).
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